

Not Just Ethnic Voters: The Effect of Economic and Immigration Appeals on Latinos*

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Abstract

Studies of ethnic minority voters have long considered the role of both ethnic identities and economic interests. However, American political behavior research on Latino voters emphasizes ethnic identity and the related issue of immigration while neglecting the potential persuasive effect of rhetoric on economics, such as jobs and inflation, and on services, such as healthcare and education. To address this gap, I fielded three survey experiments with online samples of Latino Democrats, independents, and Republicans, who evaluated candidate messages that varied in their partisan label and rhetoric on immigration or economics. While Latino Democrats and Republicans positively evaluated in-party messages regardless of policy, Latino independents reacted most positively to either party's economic messages. Meanwhile, both positive and negative messages about undocumented immigration were generally more polarizing than persuasive. These findings demonstrate the need for more research on the potential persuasive effects of economic appeals on Latinos and other groups.

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1 Introduction

A long literature in Latino¹ political behavior has emphasized the effects of various immigration-related discourses and messages on Latino voting behavior and mobilization. For example, outreach in favor of immigrant rights, such as Barack Obama’s executive action Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), has been shown to be an important factor for explaining why many Latinos identify as and support Democrats (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Saavedra Cisneros 2017). Several studies similarly argue that exposure to anti-immigrant threat, such as Donald Trump’s rhetoric demeaning Mexican immigrants or his support for more militarized immigration enforcement, can mobilize Latino voters (García Bedolla 2005; Reny, Wilcox-Archuleta, and Nichols 2018; S. Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2019; A. Gutierrez et al. 2019). As both parties become increasingly polarized on racial issues in general and especially on immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Tesler 2016), these studies imply that Democratic outreach emphasizing immigrant inclusion, coupled with Republican support for more punitive immigration policies, would eventually lead to growing Democratic support among Latinos (Barreto and Segura 2014). However, studies examining Latino voting behavior in recent elections—including 2016 and 2020, when Donald Trump was the Republican presidential nominee—have found that aggregate rates of Latino partisanship and vote choice have stayed more or less stable (Corral and Leal 2020; B. L. Fraga, Velez, and West 2022; D. Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez 2023). This stability also reflects the large portion of Latinos who have remained nonpartisan and persistently less likely to vote amidst recent partisan polarization on immigration (Hajnal and Lee 2011; García Bedolla and M. R. Michelson 2012; B. L. Fraga 2018). Following a period when immigration was a highly salient and partisan-polarized issue, the stability of Latino voting behavior presents a significant theoretical and empirical puzzle (Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez 2018).

¹I use “Latino” interchangeably with other pan-ethnic identity terms such as “Hispanic,” “Latina,” “Latinx,” etc.

A recent study by Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez (D. Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez (2023)) argues that Latinos had already sorted into their respective ethnic/partisan camps even before the 2016 election; they ultimately claimed that this largely explains the relative stability of Latino vote choice during recent elections (see also Corral and Leal 2020; B. L. Fraga, Velez, and West 2022). Other recent work has made clear that the relationship between racial identity and political behavior can vary significantly based on an individual's identity or on more contextual factors (Lee 2008; Pérez 2015; I. K. White and Laird 2020; Stout 2020). This variation in ethnic identity strength among individual Latinos has translated into major cleavages in terms of their partisanship and responses to immigration rhetoric: Latinos with strong ethnic attachments are more likely to be Democrats and to support liberal policies on immigration (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Saavedra Cisneros 2017; Marsh and Ramírez 2019; D. Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez 2023), while Latinos with weaker ethnic attachments are more likely to be Republican and to support exclusionary immigration policies, especially on undocumented immigration (Alamillo 2019; Hickel et al. 2020; Cortez 2020; Cadava 2020). One implication of this growing body of work may be that further immigration messaging is unlikely to shift opinions. I argue that existing research on Latino voting behavior overemphasizes the role of ethnic identity and immigration to continue mobilizing Latino voters in the US's contemporary, highly sorted context. As such, questions remain about how to persuade Latino voters beyond an emphasis on immigration and ethnic identity.

In this paper, I assert that messaging strategies towards Latinos that incorporate economic policies have unexplored persuasive potential. In my definition of "economic policies," I include general references to jobs and growth as well as specific topics like inflation and social welfare programs, including education and healthcare. Theories and empirical tests of linked fate—developed to explain high levels of Black support for the Democratic Party but used to predict minority voting behavior more broadly—pay close attention to the tradeoffs individuals navigate between voting for one's racial/ethnic group interest and their personal

economic well-being (Dawson 1995; Cohen 1999). Importantly, Latinos are less likely than Blacks to hold a strong sense of racial linked fate (Gay, Hochschild, and A. White 2016; Marsh and Ramírez 2019; Pérez 2021). Additionally, just like Americans in general, Latinos care greatly about baseline pocketbook concerns such as job growth, the state of the economy, and being able to provide adequate services such as healthcare and education for themselves and their families (Downs 1957; DeSipio and Garza 2015; Krogstad and Lopez 2020; Lasala-Blanco et al. 2023). Many Latinos are immigrants or the children of immigrants who came to the US specifically seeking economic opportunity and a stronger social safety net (Oboler 1995; Kochhar and Cillu o 2018; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020). I posit that messaging on economics may be more appealing to Latinos in aggregate, and thus may be a more effective campaign strategy, because this strategy is not as polarizing or partisan as the topics of immigration and abortion. Further, economic messaging may be more appealing to Latinos who remain independents despite the high salience of immigration messaging; it thus has the potential to increase turnout among Latino voters.

To test these claims, I use a series of online survey experiments exposing Latino voters² to either fictional campaign messaging or simulated electoral contests between Democratic and Republican candidates. In a first study ran in April 2021, I had a Cint sample of 290 Latino voters who identified as Democrats and independents evaluate a fictional Democratic candidate based on a Facebook status that was randomly assigned to contain economic, immigration, or no policy messaging. While Democrats in my sample expressed equal desire to vote for the fictional candidate regardless of policy message, independents were significantly more likely to express a desire to vote for him when exposed to a progressive economic message compared to either a pro-undocumented message or a non-policy control.

To expand upon these results, I ran a second larger study in December 2021. I had 1575 Latino voters who identified as Democrat, Republican, or independent evaluate a wider range of economic and immigration messages, this time from a Democratic candidate followed by

²Voter registration status is self-reported. Respondents were also restricted to only include those who were 18+, US residents, Latino/Hispanic identifiers, and those with at least minimal English language skills.

a Republican candidate. Economic messages included progressive economic stances from Democratic candidates, conservative pro-business stances from Republicans, and moderate economic stances referencing growth and services from both. Immigration messages included liberal pro-undocumented stances from Democrats, conservative anti-undocumented stances from Republicans, and pro-legal immigration stances from both. Again, I found that economic messaging—particularly the Democrat’s progressive message and the Republican’s moderate-growth message—were positively evaluated by Latino independents and even some Latino Democrats. On immigration, Democratic pro-undocumented message sparked negative evaluations from Republicans and Republican-leaning independents and was only evaluated more positively than other messages by Democratic-leaning independents. The Republican anti-undocumented message, meanwhile, received significantly negative evaluations from Democrats, Democrat-leaning independents, and independents with no partisan leanings.

In a third study, I used a conjoint design with an online Cint sample of 808 Latino voters, again with a wide range of partisan identities and an over-sample of independents. Each respondent was exposed to a series of six simulated general elections which were always between a Democrat and a Republican. In each election, respondents were forced to choose one candidate to vote for. I randomly assigned each candidate’s race/ethnicity (White/Latino) and whether these candidates utilized messages on economics, abortion, and immigration. All three policy areas were shown at once. The policy messages included both partisan messages that would only be used by candidates from one party (e.g., a Democrat message in favor of taxing the rich, or a Republican message supporting a full abortion ban) and more moderate messages that could be used by either party (e.g., favoring high-quality education and healthcare, or supporting greater numbers of legal immigrants). I also included a “blank” condition for each policy, which served as a baseline and tested how respondents evaluate a candidate who does not have a policy on a given issue. I found that partisanship was the most important driver of vote choice among partisans and partisan-leaning inde-

pendents, as might be expected. For policies, I found consistent evidence that candidates who used economic messages received more support overall, especially when they mentioned healthcare/education and in ation/small businesses. Furthermore, policy messaging on immigration had no effect on any partisan identity subgroup in terms of their vote choice. These results demonstrate that partisanship mattered most to Latino voters, followed by economic policy, with abortion and immigration not having as strong of an independent effect perhaps given pre-existing sorting. The positive persuasive effect of economic messaging on Latino independents is especially notable since these messages could address persistently low rates of political engagement among Latinos overall.

This paper offers at least three contributions to our understanding of Latino political behavior. First, I evaluate a wide range of candidate policy messages beyond just immigration. While economic issues are consistently at the top of observational studies of Latino issue priorities (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Barreto and Segura 2014; DeSipio and Garza 2015; Krogstad and Lopez 2020), there is no published experimental work testing the effects of economic messages on Latino voting behavior. Through my experimental designs, I am also able to test the effect of messaging on economics versus other potentially salient policy areas, such as immigration and abortion access (Holman, Podrazik, and Mohamed 2020; Hickel et al. 2020).

Second, while Latino Democrats and Republicans have increasingly converged towards their respective parties in terms of their policy views and voting behavior (Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Alamillo 2019; B. L. Fraga, Velez, and West 2022), Latino independents remain disengaged despite intense immigration messaging in recent years (Hajnal and Lee 2011; B. L. Fraga 2018). My experimental results demonstrate that incorporating more economic messaging may help address the persistently low rates of voter turnout among Latinos by reaching otherwise-unpersuaded Latino independents (García Bedolla and M. R. Michelson 2012). Campaigns that incorporate such messages into their Latino outreach, I argue, will experience greater electoral support from an ideologically broad range of Latino

voters.

Third, this paper offers a portrait of contemporary Latino voting behavior following a theoretically meaningful sea change in the contours of electoral politics. Several studies focusing on the pre-Trump and even pre-Obama period asserted that low rates of Latino political participation were in part caused by campaigns failing to incorporate messaging on ethnic identity and immigration into their outreach (for example, see Hajnal and Lee 2011). However, circumstances have changed in the decades since these studies: Obama shifted Democrats toward supporting immigrant rights; Trump used xenophobic rhetoric towards immigrants throughout his candidacy; and racial and partisan polarization has generally intensified (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Mason 2015; Tesler 2016; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019). I provide an updated analysis of how Latinos with a range of ethnic and partisan identities respond to political messaging after having experienced these vast changes in how each party discusses Latinos and immigrants in general.

2 Why Immigration is Insufficient

In order to address contemporary trends in Latino voting behavior and to explain why immigration messaging is insufficient by itself to effect large-scale shifts in Latino voting patterns, it is important to evaluate what campaigns and academics have emphasized in their past efforts and research. While Latinos have historically been courted fairly extensively by candidates from both parties (Subervi-Velez 2009; Mora 2014; Francis-Fallon 2019; Cadava 2020), recent research paints a more complicated picture. From around 2000 through to the Obama years, several studies argued that both parties were neglecting Latino voter outreach and avoiding the topics of immigration and ethnic identity because they were worried about losing White voter support (Wong 2006; García Bedolla and M. R. Michelson 2012; Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Since Obama's support for immigration reform such as DACA and especially since Donald Trump's nomination, however, the emphasis in

research and media accounts has been on how clearly polarized each party now is on the issue of immigration, with the implication being that Democratic support for immigrant rights and Republican support for immigrant exclusion will drive Latinos towards supporting Democrats (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; A. Gutierrez et al. 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019).

However, research on Latino vote choice has challenged this narrative, showing that Latino support for candidates from either party has remained relatively stable (roughly 70% Democrat, 30% Republican) over the 2016-2022 time period (Corral and Leal 2020; B. L. Fraga, Velez, and West 2022; D. Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez 2023). For example, Corral and Leal (Corral and Leal (2020)) demonstrate that across multiple election-year and post-election snapshots of the 2016 elections, Latino support for Republicans including Trump was never lower than 30% and was potentially even higher than what previous Republican nominee Mitt Romney received in 2012. Research on Latino partisanship finds that while overall Latino partisanship has remained relatively stable (D. Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez 2023), this may be due to sorting on either side of the partisan spectrum (B. L. Fraga, Velez, and West 2022). It is important to note that these studies do not argue that immigration had no effect on sorting instead, as aforementioned, Hopkins, Kaiser and Pérez (D. Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez (2023)) note that the surprising stability of Latino vote choice during this time period occurred because Latinos had already sorted on issues of ethnic identity and immigration, not despite such issues.

An explanation for these trends that have been addressed more frequently in the Latino politics literature is how the reactions of Latino voters to identity and immigration-related appeals is deeply affected by their individual ethnic attachments (García Bedolla 2005; Lee 2008; Valenzuela and M. Michelson 2016; Pérez 2015; Pérez 2021). While Latinos with strong ethnic identities behave as might be expected from theories of ethnic politics and become more engaged or persuaded when exposed to immigration-related messaging, those with weaker ethnic ties either respond neutrally or negatively (García Bedolla 2005; Pérez 2015; Valenzuela and M. Michelson 2016). This variation is a potential reason that the effect

of immigration messaging is not as positive as might be expected: even if many Latinos are persuaded by such rhetoric, its marginal effect eventually reaches a ceiling, and further immigration messaging is thus not effective at shifting aggregate voter behavior. Other policy areas beyond just immigration are important to consider to effectively understand Latino voting behavior.

3 Why Economics Might be Persuasive

Economic concerns a broad category that includes jobs, taxation, and inflation are consistently at the top of Latino issue polls and research on Latino issue opinions, with social services such as healthcare and education following closely behind (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Barreto and Segura 2014; DeSipio and Garza 2015; Krogstad and Lopez 2020; Krogstad, Edwards, and Lopez 2022). These studies generally find that Latinos favor Democratic positions on these issues, such as reducing economic inequality and increasing social service spending (Chong and Kim 2006; Barreto and Segura 2014; DeSipio and Garza 2015; Kochhar and Cillullo 2018). However, Latinos are less consistently partisan in their general economic outlook, as they tend to strongly support values of American entrepreneurialism and to believe that America provides them economic opportunity (L. Fraga et al. 2010; Saavedra Cisneros 2017; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020; Lasala-Blanco et al. 2023). Still, given the lack of experimental testing of these messages on Latino voting behavior, and the relative paucity of research on Latinos' views towards economic issues more generally, it is unclear which economic policies are potentially the most effective at appealing to Latinos.

Relatedly, it is unclear which party's economic policies might be more persuasive and how this differs based on Latino voters' partisan attachments or lack thereof. Partisan alignment among Latino voters has likely occurred along economic as well as immigration policy views; Latino Democrats tend to strongly support liberal policies such as raising the minimum wage and taxing the rich, while Latino Republicans are more likely to endorse

free-market views (Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003; Garza and Cortina 2007; Barreto and Segura 2014). Still, given the observational nature of this work, there remain questions about the direct effect of economic messaging on Latinos: Odio and Stein (Odio and Stein (2021)), for example, suggest that the economy could have been a cover for conservative Latinos to support Trump despite (or even because of) his racial rhetoric. Similarly, Ocampo, Garcia-Rios, and Gutierrez (Ocampo, S. I. Garcia-Rios, and A. E. Gutierrez (2021)) suggest that COVID-19 closures potentially made Trump's policy of opening the economy more popular, especially among working-class Latinos who were the hardest hit (see also Vargas and Sanchez 2020). Further, the views of Latino nonpartisans towards each party's economic platforms remains unclear. While past research suggests that Latino independents favor Democratic economic stances (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010), more recent work from the 2020 elections finds that Latino independents who voted for Trump often cited the economy as their most important issue (Odio and Stein 2021; Ocampo, S. I. Garcia-Rios, and A. E. Gutierrez 2021). While Latino partisans have potentially sorted into their respective camps based on issues including immigration and economics, Latino independents' response to economic messaging is an open question one that I address in this paper.

4 Theory of Latino Partisan Sorting

Synthesizing these research strands, I theorize that extant racialized partisan sorting has produced a political context in which economic messaging may be more persuasive among the aggregate Latino voting population than immigration messaging. Foremost, an accurate understanding of contemporary Latino voting behavior can only be achieved by recognizing the extent to which Latino partisanship, ethnic identity, and immigration are deeply inter-linked (Lee 2008; Beltrán 2010; Ramírez 2015; Sen and Wasow 2016). Latino Democrats tend to identify strongly with Latino identity and are thus likely to support pro-immigrant candidates and oppose anti-immigrant candidates (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Huddy, Ma-

son, and Horwitz 2016; Saavedra Cisneros 2017). Latino Republicans, meanwhile, tend to support exclusionary views towards undocumented immigrants and be socially conservative (Alamillo 2019; Cortez 2020; Cadava 2020; Hickel et al. 2020). This research finds that differences in Latino ethnic identity strength coincide with partisan identities; rather than causing cross-pressures, this may explain why the Latino vote share did not shift in favor of Democrat candidates despite Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric. As such, I posit that Latino Democrats and Republicans will behave largely like partisans not instead of their ethnic identity, but because their ethnic/partisan identities coincide. In a competitive general election, they should thus tend to support in-party candidates regardless of which policies are mentioned, including immigration.

Latino independents, however, are much less likely to hold strong partisan identities. This is especially true because Latino independents are less likely than White or Black independents to lean towards either party. Further, even Latino independents who do lean are less likely to be weak partisans, i.e., independents who consistently vote for one party, compared to White/Black independent leaners (Hajnal and Lee 2011; B. L. Fraga 2018). Further, and critically, the continued nonpartisan status of Latino independents during the last two decades when immigration messaging was the most intense and many Latinos seemed to sort into political parties based on their ethnic identities and immigration attitudes suggests that ethnicity and immigration are less influential in shaping remaining Latino independents' political behavior. Thus, I argue that messaging on economics and social services may have greater potential to persuade remaining independents compared to immigration messaging. Given extant literature, I posit that both parties' economic platforms might appeal to Latino independents.

4.1 Hypotheses

Based on the above theory of Latino partisan sorting, I generated and pre-registered³ two theoretical predictions for how I expect different groups of Latino voters to respond to various immigration, economic, and abortion policy messages from each party. First, I hypothesize that Latino partisans are largely sorted into their respective partisan camps including on the issue of undocumented immigration and are unlikely to significantly shift their opinions from just one or two messages, regardless of what policies are mentioned in those messages.

Hypothesis 1 (H1) Latino Democrats and Latino Republicans will react equally positively to all in-party messages, and equally negatively to all out-party messages, regardless of the message's policy content.

Second, I hypothesize that contemporary Latino independents are less likely than Latino partisans to view immigration as a high-salience issue and to be affected by immigration messaging. Meanwhile, since economic messaging tops surveys of Latino issue priorities, these messages may have greater potential to reach Latino independents, who have remained disproportionately unpersuaded and demobilized by current campaign strategies emphasizing immigration (Cruz Nichols 2017; B. L. Fraga 2018). Existing work is unclear about which party's economic policies are more appealing to Latinos overall, so it is possible that any kind of economic messaging has the potential to persuade Latino independents.

Hypothesis 2 (H2) Latino independents will react positively to either parties' economic messages compared to their other messages (e.g., non-policy, immigration).

5 Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I designed and administered three separate survey experiments with online samples of Latino voters. All three survey experiments were pre-registered on-

³Hypotheses and a pre-analysis plan were pre-registered before data collection.

line before data collection. Although I only ran the surveys in English, the demographic characteristics of all three samples are very similar to those of Latino voters in the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) and the 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES) in terms of state of residence, gender, age, education, income, religion, national origin, immigrant generation, Latino identity strength, Latino linked fate, and previous self-reported voting history (Barreto, Frasure-Yokley, et al. 2016; Ansolabehere, Schaner, and Luks 2021):⁴

In each of the three surveys, I block-randomized treatment assignment by partisan identity to ensure sufficient numbers of each group in each treatment condition. My goal was to accurately estimate the behavior of individuals within each partisan identity subgroup (Grimmer, Marble, and Tanigawa-Lau 2022), not to make direct estimates to the Latino population (e.g., Corral and Leal 2020). As such, my results should be interpreted as describing how a certain type of Latino voter, i.e., one from a certain partisan identity subgroup, reacts to each party's immigration/economic/abortion/non-policy messages. Once these pre-treatment moderators were collected (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018), respondents viewed the experimental portions, which are described more below. After the experiments, respondents completed manipulation checks, remaining demographics, and a full debrief.

6 Study 1: Simulated Facebook Status

I ran my first study in April 2021 with an online Latino voter sample from the survey company Cint conducted in English. This sample only included Democrats (N = 150) and independents (N = 140). In the experimental portion, respondents were shown a Facebook status from a fictitious Democratic candidate for the US House of Representatives named Mark Fisher, whose profile picture was of a professionally dressed middle-aged White male. While I designed this study to test the effect of appeals from a non-Latino candidate on

⁴See Supplementary Appendix Table A for a full sample comparison.

⁵See Supplementary Appendix Section B for full survey flow

Latino voters, manipulation checks revealed that a modest number of respondents perceived Fisher as being Latino himself⁶.

The text of Fisher's Facebook status varied in its economic and immigration policy references, resulting in four conditions: a nonpolicy control, a progressive economic message, a race-class economic message, and a pro-undocumented message. The nonpolicy control message referenced politicians who make promises but fail to deliver; this tone and structure was replicated in the other messages as well. The progressive economic message called out wealthy donors and called for working-class solidarity; a minimum wage increase; and increased spending on infrastructure, education, and healthcare. These are economic issues in which Latinos have historically been closer to Democratic positions (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Barreto and Segura 2014). The race-class economic message, inspired by the work of Haney López (López (2019)), used language similar to the progressive economic message but also specifically called out anti-immigrant scapegoating as a tool used by conservatives to divide and distract. This strategy attempts to neutralize racial rhetoric while emphasizing shared support for Democratic economic priorities (López 2019). Last, the pro-undocumented message called out xenophobic politicians and expressed support for the Latino/Hispanic community and a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. After viewing the message, respondents answered how likely they would be to vote for the candidate if they could, ranging from 1 (Extremely unlikely) to 5 (Extremely likely). This outcome is the dependent variable for my analyses in Study 1.

⁶I attempted to use a picture of a White male to minimize other potential effects resulting from support for Latino/co-ethnic candidates or differential evaluations by gender. In post-treatment manipulation checks, I asked respondents to guess about Fisher's race/ethnicity; 75% thought he was White, 22% thought he was Latino, and 2% thought he was Black. This did not vary significantly based on which message he used.

6.1 Results: Study 1

Insert Figure 1 Here

In Figure 1, I display visual results from an ordinal logistic regression model estimating the effect of treatment assignment on how respondents evaluated each ⁷ad. I separate analyses for Democratic and independent respondents. I find that Democratic respondents expressed equally high levels of support for Fisher regardless of which message they were exposed to. Independents, meanwhile, did not react significantly to the pro-undocumented message but were significantly more positive about the progressive economic message ($p < 0.05$) and slightly positive towards the race-class economic message ($p < 0.1$) relative to the control. I find continued evidence of strong partisan loyalty among Democrats, at least for in-party messages, while independents were more positive towards economic rather than generic or immigration-related messages. Overall, these results provide additional support for my two hypotheses. In support of my partisan loyalty hypothesis (H1), I find that Democrats expressed the same level of desire to vote for the candidate regardless of whether he mentioned no policy, immigration, or either economic stance. In support of my independent pocketbook voter hypothesis (H2), I find that independents were more likely to express a desire to vote for the candidate when he mentioned economics compared to the non-policy and immigration conditions.

7 Study 2: Ad Transcripts

To expand upon these results, I designed and administered a second survey on a larger sample of Latino voters ($N = 1575$) accessed via Qualtrics from December 2021 through February 2022. To achieve sufficient partisan representation, I sampled equal numbers of Democrats ($N = 349$) and Republicans ($N = 346$). Similarly, to achieve variety in partisan attachments

⁷I use ordinal logistic regressions (polr package in R) because my outcome measures are ordinal but not equally spaced/cardinal. Results do not change substantively when using OLS.

among independents, I sampled roughly equal numbers of independents who lean Democrat (N = 324), lean Republican (N = 219), or do not lean towards either party (N = 337). Note that while the sample overall is not comparable to the Latino electorate, which skews more Democratic, the demographic profile of the Democrats, Republicans, and independents in my sample are very similar to other Latino survey samples (see Supplementary Appendix Table A1).

In Study 2, I extended my inquiries in two ways: by including liberal, moderate, and conservative policy messages on economics and immigration and by including a Republican treatment arm immediately after the Democratic messages. The Democrat and the Republican candidates were both given stereotypically White male names, so this study is again testing the effect of appeals from (ostensibly⁸) White candidates towards Latinos. Only the Democrat could use liberal messages, only the Republican could use conservative messages, and both candidates could use moderate messages. I compared reactions to these messages to reactions to a non-policy baseline from each candidate. In the Democrat's non-policy control, the candidate is against politicians who fail to deliver, against those who emphasize divisive policies, and in favor of policies that are more broadly beneficial. In the Republican's non-policy control, the candidate is fighting against politicians who just want to win, expresses support for traditional values, and is in favor of avoiding distractions to pass policies that matter. Subsequent treatment messages used the same structure but also included specific policy messages.

For immigration, I included messages referencing both undocumented and legal immigration. As in Study 1, the liberal (Democratic) immigration treatment condition used a pro-undocumented message that pushed back against politicians who point the finger at undocumented immigrants and expressed support for a pathway to citizenship. The moderate immigration treatment conditions used pro-legal messages in which the candidate was against anti-immigrant (but not anti-undocumented) politicians and simultaneously supported legal

⁸65% of respondents thought the Democrat was White, while 80% thought the Republican was White.

immigration and greater immigration enforcement. Both candidates adopted similar policy positions with slightly modified wording: the Democrat's pro-legal message supported more legal skilled immigrants with proper vetting, while the Republican's pro-legal message supported increased legal limits and increased border security. Last, the conservative immigration treatment condition was an anti-undocumented message in which the Republican candidate was against a broken immigration system and in favor of border security to stop illegal immigrants from bringing crime and drugs.

For economics, I provided an ideologically broader range of stances than in Study 1. In the liberal economic treatment condition, the Democratic candidate used a progressive economic message similar to Study 1's, which opposed rich corporations and donors and was in favor of raising the minimum wage and increasing spending on healthcare and education. In the moderate economic messages, the candidate was against those who ignore the economy for divisive topics (which are left undefined). The Democratic moderate economic message then referenced infrastructure, small businesses, and spending on healthcare and education, while the Republican moderate economic message referenced infrastructure, small businesses, and business/worker cooperation. Last, in the conservative economic treatment condition, the Republican candidate used a pro-business message in which he opposed those who demonize businesses and stood in favor of lowering taxes and business regulations in order to create more jobs. This message mirrors past Republican appeals to Hispanic entrepreneurs and those fleeing socialist regimes (Cadava 2020).

In the survey experiment, respondents first viewed messages from the Democratic candidate. Like in Study 1, respondents were told that they were viewing messages from a hopeful Democratic candidate who is running for a nearby House district. He was again named Mark Fisher, although no picture was provided. They then viewed the non-policy control message, which was the same across respondents to establish a baseline for how individuals from each partisan identity subgroup responded to a generic Democratic message. After viewing the message, respondents answered how they reacted to the ad and just that ad from 1

(Extremely negatively) to 5 (Extremely positively). This non-policy/pure partisanship baseline was important to establish before any policy details were provided because Latino Democrats and Republicans were likely familiar with each party's policy platforms already, while Latino independents likely had less political knowledge and less crystallized views towards each party and its policies (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Tesler 2015). Respondents were then exposed to their first Democratic treatment message, which was block-randomized within partisan identity subgroups to one of the four Democratic message conditions. They then provided their evaluations of that ad from 1-5. After these initial two ads, respondents eventually viewed the remaining three Democratic treatment ads.

After viewing the five Democratic messages, respondents were then introduced to Mark Fisher's Republican challenger, who also had a stereotypically White male name (Jonathan Miller). Again, each respondent was shown and asked to evaluate a non-policy control ad (sixth ad overall) followed by the Republican treatment ad, which was block-randomized to one of the four Republican message conditions. Note that the Republican candidate always came after the five Democratic messages to minimize spillover.

7.1 Results: Study 2

In my analyses, I focus on estimating heterogeneous treatment effects within partisan identity subgroups. I separate Latino independents based on their partisan leanings either towards Democrats, towards Republicans, or towards neither. For each candidate, I show five separate OLR models that estimate the effects of each treatment message on ad evaluations (1-5). The dependent variable in these analyses is a combination of two outcomes: how respondents evaluated the candidate's first ad, which was always a non-policy control, and how they then evaluated the candidate's second ad, which again was block-randomized within each partisan identity subgroup to maximize power for within-group comparisons of treatment effects. I then compare the treatment effect of each message with the entire group's control baseline. For example, in Table 1 (below), the coefficient for Moderate Econ. for Democrats can be

interpreted as the average response of the roughly 25% of Democratic respondents who were block-randomized to view that message second, compared to the entire sample's evaluation of the control message. To account for the fact that each respondent provided two outcomes, I estimate standard errors that are clustered by respondent.⁹

Insert Table 1 Here

In Table 1, I display five OLR models estimating the effect of treatment assignment on ad evaluations. For Democratic respondents, I again find no evidence of significant messaging effects, providing further evidence of partisan loyalty. Still, while these results are insignificant, the coefficients for the Democratic respondents in this study are in the positive direction. Independents who lean Democratic, however, reacted significantly positively to both the progressive economic (0.718) and pro-undocumented (0.700) messages, indicating that these voters supported liberal Democratic messages. Among independents with no lean, I find no messaging effects, with coefficients very close to zero for most messages as well. Last, independents who lean Republican reacted significantly negatively to both the pro-undocumented (-0.902) and pro-legal (-0.906) messages, while Republicans also reacted negatively to the pro-undocumented (-0.966) and (less) negatively to the pro-legal (-0.451) and progressive economic messages (-0.553). Overall, while Democratic respondents were favorable towards all messages, there is evidence that Latino independents who lean Democrat favored liberal messaging on economics and immigration. There were also strong negative reactions to (undocumented) immigration messaging among Latino Republicans and independents who lean Republican.

Insert Table 2 Here

⁹Results are robust to alternate models (when the DV is difference between control and treatment: Tables A2, A3, and when OLS is used instead of OLR: A4, A5). They also remain largely consistent after the inclusion of other important demographic variables, such as immigrant generation, national origin, and self-reported proportion of their social network that is undocumented (see Supplementary Appendix for figures and Tables A6/A7 for a summary).

In Table 2, I show a similar set of results for evaluations of the Republican candidate messages. The first set of significant results come from the Republican's moderate economic message, which had a positive effect on Democrats (0.571), Democrat-leaning independents (0.587), and independents with no lean (0.728). The estimated size of this effect for each of these subgroups is modest but still shows significant increases on the 1-5 positive/negative scale. This positive effect is surprising given my hypotheses about partisan loyalty. However, the pro-business economic message did not have a positive effect among any subgroup, suggesting that Latinos were more swayed by the Republican's moderate rather than his conservative/pro-business economic rhetoric. The second set of significant results comes from the anti-undocumented message, which had a powerful negative effect on evaluations for every subgroup besides Republicans. This effect is substantively quite large for Democrats (-1.043) and for Democratic-leaning independents (-1.120). It is also perhaps surprisingly significant and moderately strong for Republican-leaning independents (-0.849) and is also modest but significantly negative for independents with no partisan lean (-0.492). The pro-legal message, meanwhile, did not produce similar negative effects. And while many Latinos were favorable towards moderate Republican economic messaging, including Democrats and Democrat-leaners, this result shows that xenophobic rhetoric from Republicans even when directed primarily at undocumented immigrants was politically toxic for most Latinos in my sample.

8 Study 3: Conjoint Candidate Evaluations

I ran a third and final study in which I exposed a nationally representative sample of Latino voters to a sequence of six conjoint-randomized candidate choice tasks. Instead of analyzing candidate and message evaluations as I did in Study 1 and Study 2, in this study I analyzed a binary vote choice variable. I launched the survey on Qualtrics from March 2023 through April 2023 and obtained a sample of 808 Latino registered voters. Once again, I over-sampled

Latino independents and independent leaners and collected equally sized samples of Latino Democrats and Republicans. In each task, respondents were shown two fictional candidate profiles: one Democrat, and one Republican. Each candidate varied in his race/ethnicity (White or Latino) and level on three policy areas: economics, immigration, and abortion. Messages were moderate, partisan, or empty for each policy area.¹⁰

Because of my interest in the effects of economic policy, I included an ideologically varied range of such messages from both parties. Both Democrats and Republicans could have moderate economic policy positions on broadly popular issues like social services, infrastructure, and inflation/small businesses. These messages test the effect of various positions on economic policy and opportunity, which either party could plausibly use. Each party then also had a partisan economic message: Democrats could use a progressive message (i.e., support addressing inequality by taxing the rich, raising the minimum wage) while Republicans could use an anti-socialist message (i.e., support free markets instead of adopting socialist policies). Last, instead of using an economic policy message, candidates could have an empty cell. This level was crucial because it facilitated comparison of how respondents evaluated candidates who did and did not use an economic message. Furthermore, it allowed me to test which economic message was most persuasive, and for whom.

For immigration and abortion, I included two moderate positions that the candidate from either party could use, one partisan message per candidate, and an empty condition. Moderate immigration messages could be pro-legal immigration (i.e., allow higher numbers of legal immigrants each year) and pro-border security (i.e., invest in stronger and more modern border security). While the parties are increasingly polarized on immigration, these positions are moderate enough such that either a Democrat or a Republican could plausibly use them.¹¹ The partisan message for Democrats was pro-undocumented immigration (i.e.,

¹⁰Issue and candidate party order is randomized at the respondent-level (not the election-level) to reduce ordering effects while still making it easier for respondents to keep track of multiple traits over multiple elections.

¹¹For example, President Biden supported both a pathway to citizenship AND increased spending on border security in his 2023 State of the Union speech. Former President Trump similarly supported building a border wall with a big door to signal his support for legal immigrants while still signaling support for

supported a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants) and for Republicans was anti-undocumented immigration (i.e., supported greatly increased border security to stop illegal aliens and drug traffickers).

Abortion has also become an increasingly salient political issue, especially since the 2022 *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* decision, which ended the previous *Roe v. Wade* precedent that abortion access was legal nationwide. Now, policy debates about abortion often center around when restrictions on termination should be instituted. Moderate messages, which again could be used by either candidate, included an early limit that made abortion legal until the second trimester (13 weeks) and a more permissive limit that made it legal until the third trimester (27 weeks). The partisan Democratic message supported making abortion legal nationwide, as under the *Roe* precedent, while the partisan Republican message supported banning abortion entirely outside of exceptions for rape and incest. Both immigration and abortion policy areas could also have an empty condition, which again allowed me to compare candidates who used each of these immigration/abortion messages to those who did not. For a full list of each of these policy messages, see the Supplementary Appendix.

With both candidate profiles still up, respondents were asked who they would vote for (Democrat or Republican). They then completed the same task another three times (four elections total, eight candidates total). My sample ($N = 808$) again included Latino registered voters with roughly equal quotas of Democrats, independents who lean Democratic, independents who lean towards neither party, independents who lean Republican, and Republicans. Treatments were then block-randomized by partisan identity to maximize sample size within each party ID/message subgroup. My primary dependent variable is a forced vote choice between the Democrat and Republican candidate in the simulated election. I then estimated the effect of the candidate's partisanship, race/ethnicity, and issue position on vote choice, focusing on heterogeneous effects among partisan identity subgroups.

border enforcement.

As with other conjoint studies, I calculate AMCEs (Hainmueller, D. J. Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Kirkland and Coppock 2018). By including the empty policy level and using it as the omitted category for AMCE calculations, I can estimate how the presence (or absence) of a policy affects vote choice, rather than simply comparing the effects of different policies. This also allows me to identify candidates who use economics and those who do not. 95% confidence intervals are shown and point estimates that indicate a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.05$) from the omitted baseline category are indicated by a larger dot.

Insert Figure 2 Here

I display my full results in Figure 2 and discuss each attribute and partisan identity group individually. A candidate's partisanship is far and away the most important factor for determining a respondent's vote choice for every group besides independents with no partisan lean. Democrats were 53% more likely to support Democrats, independents who lean Democrat were 41% more likely, and even independents with no partisan lean were 15% more likely. The same effect occurs for Republicans and Republican leaners, who supported Republicans 39% and 25% more, respectively. The strength of partisan support among Democrats appears slightly stronger than among Republicans.

Meanwhile, a candidate's race/ethnicity was not an important factor across any of the partisan identity subgroup results. Respondents were not consistently more supportive of Latino over White candidates. This suggests that when a wide variety of factors are available to Latino voters beyond just the heuristic of co-ethnicity, the benefit that Latino candidates experience among Latino voters may not be as pronounced as the effects of partisanship and policy messaging. Of course, this priming of Latino co-ethnicity is also quite weak (a simple label that the candidate is Latino), so this result should be interpreted as the failure of a subtle (rather than consistently delivered) ethnic identity cue to shape Latino voting patterns.

The next factor is whether or not a candidate mentioned economic policies. Results support my arguments. Among Democrats and independents who lean Democrat, I find that the progressive, services, and infrastructure/small businesses messages are persuasive; they are associated with an 8-12% increase in estimated support relative to a candidate who had no economic policy message. Both of these groups favored liberal and moderate economic messages, with the exception of the infrastructure message. Independents with no partisan lean reacted positively to every single economic message relative to the baseline. The strongest effect is from services, which is associated with a 20% increase in support, but every economic message (including the anti-socialist message) has a statistically significant effect. Independents who lean Republican favored the same moderate economic messages (services and infrastructure/small businesses) but were not persuaded, with statistical significance, by the progressive, infrastructure, or anti-socialist messages. Finally, Republicans were generally unaffected by economic policy, with only a small significant effect from the services message.

I do not find any effect of immigration messaging on vote choice across all subgroups. This is strong evidence supporting my arguments that such messaging is unlikely to shape Latino vote choice in a competitive electoral context in an already-sorted context. However, I do find that abortion policy has a modest effect on voters from the liberal direction but does not significantly predict conservative vote choice. Democrats favored candidates who supported full legalization (10% more) with steadily decreasing support for a third trimester limit (8%) and a second trimester limit (6%) relative to the baseline. Independents who lean Democrat were not supportive of full legalization but were supportive of the third trimester limit (10%) and second trimester limit (9%). The last significant effect I observe for abortion is among independents with no partisan lean, who supported the third trimester limit (12%). For Republicans and independents who lean Republican, I do not observe that abortion policies shaped their vote choice.

9 Discussion

In all three studies, I found evidence in support of both of my hypotheses, although I also found important caveats. My experimental results offer strong evidence that Latino Democrats and Republicans favor in-party candidates and messaging, supporting H1; however, I also found that out-party evaluations are still strongly shaped by negative reactions, especially to immigration messaging. In Study 1, I found that Latino Democrats did not shift their evaluations of a Democratic candidate regardless of which message he used. In Study 2, I found a similar lack of effects from economic or immigration messaging among Latino Democrats evaluating Democratic candidate messages, and also among Latino Republicans evaluating Republican candidate messages. Finally, in Study 3, Latino Democrats and Republicans were much more likely to vote for in-party candidates and were less affected by policy messaging overall. The one positive persuasion effect from a pro-undocumented message is among Democratic-leaning independents a challenge to my argument that immigration is more divisive than persuasive. Still, the other effects I observe from immigration messaging among other subgroups and in other studies are either null or in the negative direction, suggesting that such messaging is only likely to persuade that subset rather than Latino voters overall. Furthermore, when immigration does have an effect on evaluations, it tends to occur when a respondent views a message they dislike as opposed to one they support.

In contrast to the variable effects of immigration messaging, I found that economic messaging is generally more persuasive overall and is especially effective among Latino independents. In support of my second hypothesis, I observe positive persuasion effects from both parties' economic messages on Latino independents. In Study 1, I found that Latino independents were significantly more likely to favor a Democrat who used a progressive economic message, and somewhat more likely to favor him when he used a race-class economic message (López 2019), relative to when he used a nonpolicy or pro-undocumented message. In Study 2, I again found that Democratic-leaning independents favored a Democrat's progressive economic message. However, I found even more consistently positive effects from a Repub-

lican's moderate economic message, which was evaluated positively by Latino Democrats, Democratic-leaning independents, and independents with no lean. This consistent positive effect mirrors some recent research suggesting that many Latinos have been swayed recently by Republican appeals on economic issues (Ocampo, S. I. Garcia-Rios, and A. E. Gutierrez 2021; Odio and Stein 2021). In Study 3, I generally found that candidates from either party who used economic policies received greater vote share from independent respondents than those who had a blank economic policy condition. As with Study 2, more generic policies on topics such as services and on small businesses/inflation were more consistently persuasive than were partisan messages. My results suggest that either party can best persuade Latino voters with broadly appealing messaging on growth, jobs, small businesses, and social services rather than focusing on ideologically conservative or liberal stances.

There are important caveats to my results. My surveys were only conducted in English due to concerns about cost/sample size and due to my emphasis on Latino voters rather than the Latino population at large.¹² While the demographics of Latino Democrats, Republicans, and independents in my sample are comparable to nationally representative samples like the CMPS 2016 and CES 2020 (see Supplementary Appendix Table A1), my goal was to accurately estimate the effects of partisan heterogeneity on individual behavior, not to make population-level estimates. As such, my overall respondent pool contains disproportionately more independents and Republicans than the actual Latino voter population. Again, these results should not be taken as estimates of either the behavior of the entire Latino population or of real-world voting outcomes (e.g., Corral and Leal 2020; Grimmer, Marble, and Tanigawa-Lau 2022), but instead as estimates of how individual Latino voters with a wide range of partisan attachments evaluate messages from each party on economics and immigration. These results then demonstrate which kinds of Latino voters were potentially persuaded (or not) by messaging strategies from either party on the topics of immigration,

¹²A Spanish-language survey would also include simulated messages (in Spanish) from candidates. Having a candidate speaking Spanish would represent a distinctly different type of political message than an English-language ad and would thus potentially require two separate samples.

economics, and abortion.

10 Conclusion

These findings correspond with many recent studies that find an increasing convergence between Latino partisanship, ethnic identity, and views on immigration and undocumented immigration, in particular (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez 2018; Hickel et al. 2020; B. L. Fraga, Velez, and West 2022). More broadly, this study adds to the literature assessing the effect of variation in individual racial and ethnic identities and how that variation translates into voter behavior (Dawson 1995; Sanchez 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Gay, Hochschild, and A. White 2016; Sen and Wasow 2016; Sanchez, Masuoka, and Abrams 2019; Pérez 2021). While immigration messaging clearly matters to many Latinos, this may become less true as the US-born Latino population grows in relative size, theories of Latino voter behavior must grapple with the implications of such future demographic patterns (Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez 2018). Divergent partisan pathways due to variation in responses to undocumented messaging possibly explain the relative stability we have observed in Latino vote choice despite the recent salience of immigration rhetoric in the political field (Abrajano 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Corral and Leal 2020). Even if a growing Latino Democratic coalition emerges in response to outreach on immigration reform and backlash from anti-undocumented messaging (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; A. Gutierrez et al. 2019), a smaller but still-significant plurality of Latino Republicans will also likely remain supportive because of not despite the GOP's views on immigration and undocumented immigration specifically (Alamillo 2019; Cortez 2020). To achieve an accurate picture of Latino voting behavior, scholars must account for the wide ideological and partisan diversity of the Latino voter population.

Beyond partisan evaluations, the positive effects from these economic messages, and

especially the strong effects among Latino independents, is promising for those who are interested in increasing Latino voter engagement (Hajnal and Lee 2011; García Bedolla and M. R. Michelson 2012; Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez 2018; B. L. Fraga 2018). Furthermore, as my results show, the political behavior of Latinos who remain unaffiliated with either party remains under-explained by an emphasis on immigration messaging. Given that Latino independents continue to participate at lower rates (Hajnal and Lee 2011; B. L. Fraga 2018), campaigns and other groups should attempt a broader range of messaging strategies beyond an emphasis on ethnic identity and immigration (Abrajano 2010; García Bedolla and M. R. Michelson 2012).

Latino political behavior research has increasingly grappled with the implications of Latino political diversity and how this complicates efforts at Latino political unity and cohesion (Beltrán 2010). It is important to acknowledge such diversity and to examine why this translates into variation in voting behavior (Stout 2020). However, scholars must next focus on what factors might shape the voting behavior of individuals who are not accurately captured by a theoretical framework emphasizing ethnic identity (Lee 2008). We cannot assume that the political behavior of independents and those with weak ethnic identities is somehow less coherent simply because they do not conform to what we theoretically expect from members of a given group. Instead, we must examine what they do care about. Only by examining a broader repertoire of salient topics can we effectively understand the vast diversity of voter opinions among Latinos, racial minority voters, and in general. Future studies should examine what policy messages might be most effective at persuading an ideologically broader range of Latino voters, and whether economic policy messaging might be the key to addressing persistently low rates of participation among Latinos.

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Tables

Table 1: Study 2, Democratic Candidate Results by Party ID

	DV: Sentiment towards Democratic Ad (1-5)				
	Democrats	Ind. lean D	Independent	Ind. lean R	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Moderate Econ.	0.247 (0.204)	0.323 (0.230)	0.009 (0.196)	0.201 (0.231)	0.060 (0.189)
Progressive Econ.	0.298 (0.227)	0.718 (0.222)	0.202 (0.208)	0.077 (0.290)	0.553 (0.189)
Pro-Legal	0.373 (0.234)	0.094 (0.246)	0.053 (0.212)	0.906 (0.291)	0.451 (0.222)
Pro-Undocumented	0.303 (0.221)	0.700 (0.238)	0.050 (0.235)	0.902 (0.288)	0.966 (0.230)
Observations	349	324	337	219	346

p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01

Note: The dependent variable for these analyses is a combination of how respondents evaluated the non-policy control (which is the omitted category in the regression) and how they then evaluated the second policy ad they were exposed to. Analyses use Ordinal Logistic Regression to estimate how treatment assignment affected ad evaluations, from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive). Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Table 2: Study 2, Republican Candidate Results by Party ID

	DV: Sentiment towards Democratic Ad (1-5))				
	Subgroups: Individual Party ID/Lean				
	Democrats	Ind. lean D	Independent	Ind. lean R	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Moderate Econ.	0.571 (0.187)	0.587 (0.205)	0.728 (0.171)	0.010 (0.253)	0.156 (0.169)
Pro-Business Econ.	0.082 (0.181)	0.004 (0.202)	0.269 (0.222)	0.192 (0.204)	0.011 (0.172)
Pro-Legal	0.176 (0.201)	0.084 (0.208)	0.105 (0.221)	0.241 (0.270)	0.189 (0.205)
Anti-Undocumented	1.043 (0.213)	1.120 (0.287)	0.492 (0.208)	0.849 (0.301)	0.090 (0.254)
Observations	349	324	337	219	346

Note:

p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01

Note: The dependent variable for these analyses is a combination of how respondents evaluated the non-policy control (which is the omitted category in the regression) and how they then evaluated the second policy ad they were exposed to. Analyses use Ordinal Logistic Regression to estimate how treatment assignment affected ad evaluations, from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive). Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figures

Figure 1: Study 1, Results by Respondent Partisan Identity




Figure 1: Study 2: These results are drawn from a bivariate ordinal logistic regression model showing the estimated effect of treatment assignment on the dependent variable. Colored bars represent mean levels of the hypothetical vote outcome for each messaging condition, with Democratic respondents in the left panel and independents in the right. The black lines show 95% confidence intervals, with the control as the omitted reference category.

